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Introduction
The goal of the present paper is to propose a general equilibrium model with dual labor markets which allows us to identify economic (rather than institutional) forces of downsizing of low-skilled jobs in the primary economy, implying a higher wage pressure in the secondary economy.
In the last years, an extensive literature on the relationship between wage inequality and technological change has been developed (e.g. Gregg and Manning, 1997; Galor and Tssidon, 1997; Acemoglu, 1998; Caselli, 1999; Lloyd-Ellis, 1999; Galor and Moav, 2000) . 1 However, increasing wage inequality is not the only symptom of declining demand for low-skilled labor, and is largely con…ned to the U.S. and the UK (e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997) . The more pervasive characteristic in the last two decades has been substantial downsizing of low-skilled jobs in manufacturing industries in both Anglo-American countries and Continental Europe (e.g. Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998; Machin and van Reenen, 1998) . In relatively rigid European labor markets, this has led to dramatic increases in unemployment rates for low-skilled labor. Thus, economists and policy makers more and more stress the need to create low-paid jobs in the service sector, for instance, by lowering minimum wages. In the U.S., real wages at the bottom have already declined sharply in the last decades (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Murphy and Topel, 1997) . In combination with a considerably larger service sector in the U.S. compared to, say, Germany, this seems to have helped the U.S. economy to avoid the unemployment problems now faced by Continental Europe. 2 This suggests that opening up the secondary labor market may be a successful strategy to reduce unemployment; how-1 This literature largely focuses on shifts in relative labor productivity in favor of skilled workers, i.e. on the hypothesis of so-called skill-biased technological change. According to OECD (2000) , in 1998 the total share of service employment has been 73.8 percent in the U.S. and 62.6 percent in Germany. The respective employment shares of personal services (which are characterized by particularly low-paid jobs, on average) are 12.1 compared to 7.1 percent.
1 ever, at two kinds of costs. First, a more substantial dualization of the labor market for low-skilled workers with well-paid jobs in the primary economy and low-paid jobs in the secondary economy; and second, higher overall wage inequality, coming from job rationing in the primary sector rather than from rising wage di¤erentials between skilled and unskilled workers in this sector. 3 We hypothesize that the main di¤erence between the primary and the secondary economy is technological (for instance, due to the di¤erent nature of goods produced in these sectors). The primary economy is characterized by …rms with an organizational infrastructure in which workers can interact. Thus, a crucial feature of our model is that …rms in the primary economy have to create workplaces prior to production and product market competition. This is formalized by introducing the idea of endogenous sunk costs for capacity-investments of …rms from the IO literature in a macro-labor context. 4 More precisely, …rms in the primary economy choose their number of (high-skilled and low-skilled) workplaces at a …rst stage before entering monopolistic competition in a second stage. As known from the IO literature, such a two-stage framework is natural whenever capacity choices of …rms are involved.
In a macro-labor context, it enables us to take the idea of a workplace serious. By contrast, no ex ante creation of workplaces is needed in the secondary labor market. Those workers for whom no primary jobs are organized o¤er their labor to the secondary economy.
The endogenous sunk costs for the creation of workplaces in the primary economy are speci…ed as wage costs for high-skilled managers, where managerial requirements 3 It should be noted that this view is rather di¤erent from the now famous "Krugman-hypothesis" (Krugman, 1994) , which deals with an overall trade-o¤ between wage inequality and unemployment due to wage di¤erentials in a single-sector framework. 4 See Sutton (1991 Sutton ( , 1998 for a general account of the theory of endogenous sunk costs, which is necessarily characterized by two-stage games among …rms in IO contexts, with subgame-perfect equilibria. We adopt this approach to a general equilibrium model by seeking for perfect foresight equilibria without strategic interactions. 2 and workplace creation are linked according to a linear homogenous technology.
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It should be noted that the employment share of workers in managerial occupations has substantially increased in the last two decades (e.g. Berman, Bound and Grichilis, 1994). 6 This suggests that organizational (i.e. managerial labor) requirements have increased; for instance, due to increased requirements for human resource development. In fact, this is consistent with another feature of modern economies often discussed in the IO literature: higher …xed costs in favor of lower marginal production costs.
We …nd that despite ‡exible wages such a technological change leads to downsizing of low-skilled jobs in the primary economy in a perfect foresight equilibrium. In absence of the usually considered biased changes in the production technology, this leads to a more compressed wage structure between skill groups in the primary sector, but to increased wage pressure in the secondary economy. Under ‡exible wages (i.e. the U.S. case), this results in higher wage di¤erentiation within the group of low-skilled workers across sectors. Consequently, overall wage inequality between skill groups may increase despite wage compression in the primary economy. With a minimum wage, unemployment of low-skilled labor increases, and wage inequality even declines.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents the basic structure of the economy. Section 4 derives the equilibrium in the primary economy, whereas section 5 closes the model by analyzing the equilibrium in the secondary labor market. The last section concludes.
A …rst analysis of this idea has been provided in Falkinger and Grossmann (2001) . However, this work su¤ers from two important shortcomings. First, only a one-sector framework has been considered, which does neither allow to address labor market segmentation nor to understand the policy debate on opening up the secondary economy. Second, it has been assumed that only low-skilled jobs have to be organized which is implausible. According to Grossmann (2002) , the manager share in U.S. manufacturing, for instance, has increased from 11.3 percent in 1983 to 15.8 percent in 2000.
3

Related literature
Our analysis is related to the literature on segregation and labor market dualization. Segregation of workers can mean that …rms consist of relatively homogenous groups with respect to skill levels (Kremer, 1993; Saint-Paul, 2001; Kremer and Maskin, 2002) . Whereas in this "assortative matching" literature similarly skilled workers receive the same wages whether working in homogenous or heterogenous groups, in our model some (low-skilled) workers become increasingly marginalized in a segmented labor market.
For instance, …rm-size wage di¤erentials (controlling for all individually observable characteristics of workers) have been attributed to the complexity of the …rm organization (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999; Bayard and Troske, 1999) .
Moreover, using Swiss data Ramirez (2000) …nds that the share of skilled, whitecollar workers within a …rm (which, in line with our model, is used as proxy for a …rm's organizational complexity) positively a¤ects wages. Thus, it is plausible to hypothesize that the primary and secondary labor market di¤er in the organization of …rms, with more complex …rms paying higher wages. This is exactly what our model predicts.
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Other dual labor market models which attempt to explain the decline of (relative) earning opportunities for low-skilled labor rely on the notion of so-called skill-biased technological change, i.e. a biased shift in the relative productivity towards high-skilled workers. Agénor and Aizenman (1997) study the impact of biased technology shocks on the structure of wages, when sectorial di¤erences in 7
In our model, as in the story suggested by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) to explain employer-size wage di¤erentials, high-paying …rms have market power. However, in contrast to their story, in our model equilibrium pro…ts are zero and their is no rent-sharing of employers with workers. In our model, market power is implied by the costs to install workplaces ex ante which are …xed costs ex post (i.e. at the production stage). For an alternative theory on sizewage di¤erentials, focusing on coordination failures with search in both the product and the labor market, see Shi (2002). monitoring technologies (and thus in e¢ciency wages) lead to a segmentation into primary and secondary jobs. As in our model, this implies job rationing in the sense of involuntary non-employment in the primary labor market. (See also Saint-Paul (1996a) for an extensive study of labor market segmentation in the presence of ef…ciency wage payments.) By contrast, in our model the primary and secondary labor market di¤er in the need to organize workplaces. Thus, we provide a different source of job rationing in the primary economy, related to the necessity to create workplaces ex ante. Finally, Saint-Paul (1996b) analyzes a search model with only high-skilled labor in the primary labor market and only low-skilled labor in the secondary labor market. 8 Skill-biased technological change reduces employment of low-skilled labor, as …rms have a higher incentive to wait for more productive, high-skilled workers. This incentive is stronger when more high-skilled workers are available. In our model, also low-skilled workers can be employed in the primary labor market, and high-skilled and low-skilled labor are technological complements in production. Moreover, we analyze a general equilibrium model which emphasizes the structure of goods demand. In contrast, the analysis of Saint-Paul (1996a,b) is partial equilibrium.
3 The structure of the dual economy There are two sectors in the economy, a so-called x-sector with (an exogenous number of) n …rms which produces a di¤erentiated good and a y-sector with a representative …rm which produces a homogenous good. In both sectors, labor is the only input and …rms take wages as given in their employment decisions. Technologically, the sectors di¤er in two characteristics. First, whereas in the x-sector the production process and thus employment requires an organization in …rms (e.g. Weitzman, 1982), in 8 Recently, Gautier (2002) has extended this framework of Saint-Paul (1996b) by allowing for free entry of vacancies and the possibility of high-skilled workers to occupy simple jobs. the y-sector, no organization of work is required. Second, whereas the x-sector employs both high-skilled and low-skilled labor, low-skilled labor is the only input in the y-sector. These characteristics are supposed to represent crucial technological features of the "primary" economy (x-sector) and the "secondary" economy (ysector). Examples of …rms in the x-sector include …rms like General Motors and IBM. Such …rms are characterized by complex organizational structures, high degree of interaction among employees and a substantial share of high-skilled workers. An extreme example of the secondary labor market would be self-employment of lowskilled workers. Realistically, one may also think of (low-paid) services like cleaning or newspaper selling as activities in the y-sector, which barely involve interaction among employees.
The requirement of an organization in the x-sector implies that …rms have to decide ex ante (i.e. before production starts) the design of workplaces. This encompasses two dimensions: the number of workplaces and the wage structure. In our model, this is re ‡ected by two assumptions.
First, …rms have to choose the amount of non-production (i.e. managerial) labor which is necessary to create the desired capacity of workplaces. The non-production labor requirements in a …rm positively depend on the amounts of organized highskilled and low-skilled production labor, respectively. It is assumed that only highskilled labor can be employed for the creation of workplaces.
9
A natural set-up of a model which re ‡ects the idea that designing workplaces is necessarily an ex ante decision is a two-stage framework. This follows the IO literature which hypothesizes endogenous sunk costs for capacity investments. In our model, at stage 1, …rms in the x-sector set up workplaces under perfect foresight about the ex post situation (i.e. about both wages and the nature of product market competition). At stage 9 See also Das (2001) for a model in which high-skilled workers have a double role as production and non-production workers. In his model, the non-production activity is speci…ed as supervising in the presence of shirking of production workers. 6 2 (i.e. ex post) …rms produce and supply their output on the goods market. Since the costs for non-production workers to set up workplaces are sunk when …rms enter stage 2, imperfect competition in the goods market is implied. In our model, we assume monopolistic competition among …rms in the x-sector (in stage 2). In contrast, there is perfect competition in the y-sector.
Second, …rms have to choose the wage o¤ers for the provided workplaces. It is assumed that the provision of workplaces is accompanied by hiring activities. That means …rms announce vacancies, including wage o¤ers. In standard models (like in the secondary labor market in our model), this assumption is consistent with the notion of a Walrasian auctioneer, by letting …rms announce the equilibrium wage rates. In our sunk cost approach for workplace creation in the primary economy, the assumption of the announcement of wage o¤ers has to be spelled out explicitly.
It implies that wages in the primary labor market are …xed at the equilibrium wage level anticipated by …rms under perfect foresight of aggregate employment levels in the primary economy.
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Labor markets for high-skilled and low-skilled labor are segmented, where labor supply is inelastically given by N H and N L , respectively.
Technology
Output x i of …rm i in the x-sector is produced according to the constant-returnsto-scale production technology
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This assumption precludes that, at the production stage 2, …rms in the x-sector substitute workers employed at the o¤ered wage by workers who underbid prevailing wage rates, i.e. no arbitrage possibilities exist ex post. Ex ante wages can freely be chosen. Rational …rms choose the anticipated equilibrium wage structure.
7 where h i and l i denote the amounts of high-skilled and low-skilled production labor in …rm i, respectively; a > 0. f (¢) is a strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave function which ful…lls the Inada conditions and f (0) = 0. Before production starts, workplaces ¹ h i and ¹ l i for high-skilled and low-skilled labor, respectively, have to be created. Employment in production is limited by the provided workplaces, that is: h i · ¹ h i and l i · ¹ l i . The organizational (non-production) high-skilled labor requirement m i to create production workplaces for ¹ h i and ¹ l i production workers in …rm i is given by
where G is linear homogenous and g(¢;°) is monotonic increasing in ¹ Â i .°is a shift parameter. We make the convention that the impact of an increase in°on g is positive. Moreover, following the common hypothesis in the IO literature that …xed costs and marginal production costs are negatively related, we assume that°and the productivity parameter a are positively correlated. Then an increase in°can be interpreted as a kind of technological change which is associated with an increase in total factor productivity a but rising job creation costs in the primary sector. (As shown below, a change in a does not have an independent e¤ect on the key variables in equilibrium.) Abstracting from endogenous technology choice of …rms, Output y of the representative unit in the y-sector is given by
where L y is the employment level in the y-sector.
Preferences
There is a representative consumer, deriving utility from the consumption of the di¤erentiated good produced by the x-sector and the homogenous good produced by the y-sector. Preferences are represented by a utility function u which is weakly separable in these two types of goods:
0 < ® < 1, where X is a quantity index of the di¤erentiated good given by the CES-
, 0 < ½ < 1. Thus, the elasticity of demand for each variety i produced by …rm i in the x-sector is constant and given by ¾´1 1¡½ . Denoting the price of variety i in the x-sector by p i and the price for the homogenous good in the y-sector by q, we have for the optimal consumption structure mrs i = p i q ; i = 1; :::; n;
where mrs i´@ u=@x i @u=@y is the marginal rate of substitution between x i and y.
Prices and wages
After each …rm in the x-sector has chosen the number of production workplaces ¹ h i and ¹ l i (at stage 1; see section 4), in stage 2, …rms enter monopolistic competition.
Thus, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , prices are set as (constant) mark-up over marginal costs c, i.e.
where ¹´¾ ¾¡1 > 1 is the mark-up factor.
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Denote nominal wage rates for highskilled and low-skilled production workers in the primary labor market by w H and w L;x , respectively. Cost minimization implies that relative wages
of high-skilled labor and the skill-intensity in production Â i are related by the equation
Note that this implies Â i = Â. Marginal costs are given by
according to (1) and (7). Moreover, note that at stage 2, it is optimal to utilize capacity fully; i.e. to choose employment according to
symmetry implies h i = h, l i = l and thus
In the y-sector we have perfect competition. This implies
where w L;y denotes the nominal wage rate (for low-skilled labor) in this sector.
In sum, according to (5), (6), (8) and (9), we obtain
Note that in a symmetric equilibrium in the primary economy, for all i, we have 15
The two-stage decision process of …rms in the primary economy implies that sunk nonproduction costs are not passed on to output prices. As argued above, the organizational capacity has to be determined by …rms before production starts and thus organizational costs are …xed costs at the production stage. See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2000) for a one-sector monopolistic competiton model in which entry costs are proportional to output like the organizational costs in our model. They also are not re ‡ected in output prices.
14 Note that in a perfect foresight equilibrium the installed skill-intensity in production ¹ Â = ¹ h= ¹ l coincides with the skill-intensity Â implied by the costs minimization condition (7). Moreover, …rms will not install capacity for producing output which cannot be sold.
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According to (4), for 
10
where Q´nx denotes total output in the primary economy.
Equilibrium number of primary jobs
In our two-stage framework, the perfect foresight equilibrium is derived by backwards induction.
In the preceding section the (pro…t maximizing) behavior of …rms in the x-sector at stage 2 (i.e. for a given work place capacity) has been analyzed. At stage 1, …rms in the x-sector choose their pro…t maximizing number of workplaces ¹ h i and ¹ l i , perfectly foreseeing the equilibrium at stage 2 (taking aggregate levels as given).
Pro…ts in …rm i are earnings at stage 2 minus the non-production costs incurred at stage 1. The latter are given by w H m i . Thus, pro…ts of …rm i are given by
where p is the equilibrium price determined in section 3.3, and x i and m i are given by the technology functions f and g, respectively.
Using (1), (2), (6), Â i = Â and the fact that all workplaces installed at stage 1 will indeed be occupied at stage 2 (i.e.
, we can write this in the form Thus, our equilibrium concept allows for zero pro…ts of monopolistically competitive …rms in the x-sector, despite an exogenous number of …rms n. In contrast to the free-entry equilibrium of e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , employment levels rather than the number of …rms adjust such that pro…ts are driven to zero.
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workplaces. The condition for such a zero-pro…t equilibrium is thus given by
where we used
according to (7) and (8).
As shown in full detail in the appendix, there are multiple (perfect foresight) equilibria in the model. First, if …rms expect relatively high wages of low-skilled production workers they wish to provide a high proportion of workplaces for skilled workers so that the expansion of employment may be constrained by skilled labor supply before the zero-pro…t condition is reached. Second, if …rms have pessimistic expectations, zero-pro…t equilibria with unemployment of both low-skilled and highskilled workers result. In order to point out that job rationing (i.e. involuntary non-employment of low-skilled labor in the primary labor market) is not the result of unfavorable expectations, we focus on the zero-pro…t equilibrium with full employment of high-skilled labor.
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This is the equilibrium at which employment in the primary labor market reaches the highest possible level.
18
As shown below, there is generally a wage gap between the primary and secondary labor market (i.e. w L;x > w L;y ) in equilibrium.
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Thus, workers in the secondary labor market would like to work in the primary economy. However, …rms 17 This may be compared to Weitzman (1982) , who also analyzes a monopolistic competition model where multiple (rational expectations) equilibria exist. As in the primary labor market in our model, in his model employment requires an organization in …rms. (Unlike our model, his model neither allows for another sector where no organization of work is necessary nor for heterogeneity among workers.) However, in his model involuntary unemployment is due to pessimistic expectations. In contrast, in our model due to its two-stage nature involuntary non-employment (in the primary labor market) may occur even with the most optimistic expectations.
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Of course, it is also assumed that …rms in the x-sector are not constrained by the supply of low-skilled labor. Otherwise the notion of a dual economy would not make sense.
19
In a zero-pro…t equilibrium w L;x = w L;y may only occur as a knife-edge case.
provide no workplaces for them. Hence, they must supply their labor force to the less attractive secondary economy.
In a zero-pro…t equilibrium, the skill-intensity in production in the x-sector is given by ¹ Â = Â ¤ (°), where Â ¤ (°) is implicitly de…ned by condition (13). In the comparative-static analysis we concentrate on technological changes re ‡ected in°.
It is important to note that productivity parameter a does not a¤ect the equilibrium skill intensity Â ¤ (°). Therefore, our comparative-static results regarding°apply also if a varies simultaneously with°as discussed in the introduction.
can be determined in a familiar return-cost diagram. The left-hand side of (13) equals the "real" average pro…t margin per low-skilled worker (in terms of unit costs) whereas the right-hand side equals "real" average non-production labor costs per low-skilled worker. (In the following we use the short-cuts APL and ACL, respectively). AP L is an increasing function of ¹ Â (starting at zero for ¹ Â = 0), since output per low-skilled worker is raised by a higher skill-intensity in production. As far as the right-hand side of (13) is concerned, a marginal increase in ¹ Â has two e¤ects on ACL. First, the "real" wage rate for high-skilled workers
from in…nity at ¹ Â = 0, lowering average costs to organize workplaces. Second, the average non-production labor requirement g(¹ Â) per low-skilled job may increase. It is assumed that the latter e¤ect does not outweigh the former. Thus, ACL is a nonincreasing function of ¹ Â. In sum, the intersection between the AP L-and ACL-curve determines Â ¤ (°) as depicted in …gure 1.
Figure 1
Denoting the aggregate employment level of high-skilled and low-skilled labor in production as
according to (2). This implies the following.
Proposition 1 In any zero-pro…t equilibrium, there is job-rationing of low-skilled labor in the primary economy. The maximal equilibrium employment level is given
Proof. Follows immediately from the full employment constraint
Note that the maximal zero-pro…t equilibrium employment level of low-skilled labor in the primary labor market L ¤ x corresponds to optimistic expectations and thus to full employment of high-skilled labor. depend on the number of …rms n or the productivity parameter a in the x-sector, respectively.
As can immediately be seen from (15) (15), where H e < N H is the aggregate level of employment of high-skilled labor which is expected by pessimistic …rms.
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The impact of skill-biased technological change on L ¤ x and ! ¤ x can be derived as follows. Note that, according to (7), an increase in the relative marginal productivity F 1 =F 2 (for any given skill-intensity in production Â) is equivalent to an increase in (13) as
x decreases with ³, according to (15). Moreover, it is straightforward but tedious to show that
holds.
it more di¢cult to organize jobs for low-skilled workers. Formally, this means that°i ncreases, shifting both the g-curve and thus the ACL-curve upwards. This increases average costs of providing workplaces for low-skilled workers relative to their pro…t yield, implying the following.
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Proposition 2 In any zero-pro…t equilibrium, if°increases, then both the equilibrium employment level of low-skilled labor in the primary labor market L ¤ x and the relative equilibrium wage ! ¤ x decline.
Proof. Apply the implicit function theorem to condition (13) to show that Â ¤ increases with°. Then use (15) and (7).
An increase in°means that, for any skill-intensity in production Â, the ACLcurve shifts upwards, as depicted in …gure 1. As non-production requirements for low-skilled labor rise, …rms in the primary economy have a disincentive to create jobs for the low-skilled. Note that, in contrast to the skill-bias literature, wage inequality decreases rather than increases in the primary economy. As will be seen in the next section, the sign of the overall change in wage inequality depends on institutional barriers for a secondary labor market. Note that proposition 2 holds in any zero-pro…t equilibrium, not just in one with full employment of high-skilled labor. We focus on optimistic expectations in order to discuss changes in the maximal (possible) equilibrium employment level in the primary labor market. 23 Interestingly, wage inequality between skill groups in the primary labor market (! ¤ x ) is not a¤ected by an increase in high-skilled labor supply N H , according to (7) and (13). This is due to the following opposing e¤ects. First, as in conventional models with a segmented labor market for di¤erent skill groups, an increased availability of high-skilled labor reduces wage inequality, given that the skill-intensity in production increases. Second, however, if N H increases, …rms have an incentive to install more workplaces which raises the demand for (high-skilled) organizational labor. (This reduces the skill-intensity in production and raises relative wages). In our model, both e¤ects exactly cancel. (Formally, this is due to the linear homogeneity of both F (¢) and G(¢), which implies that the (zero-pro…t) equilibrium skill-intensity Â ¤ does not depend on N H . See Egger and Grossmann (2000) for a similar result in a di¤erent context.)
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In this section, we derive the number of secondary jobs and the equilibrium wage di¤erentiation for low-skilled labor between sectors.
"Labor supply" in the secondary labor market L S y equals the amount of lowskilled labor which is not employed in the primary labor market, i.e.
Labor demand in the y-sector L D y is given by goods demand in this sector, implied by (10). Using (10) with mrs i = mrs for all i, the wage di¤erential of low-skilled labor across sectors is given by
Note that, according to (
¢ ¤ of low-skilled labor in the primary economy. For calculating mrs note that total output Q = nx in the primary economy is given by
Using this together with (3) in equation (11), we get
Combining (17) and (18), we obtain the following relationship between labor demand L D y in the y-sector and the wage di¤erential of low-skilled labor:
< 1. For the comparative-static analysis it is important to note that a cancels in (19) because of two opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, mrs decreases with a; on the other hand, the "real" equilibrium wage rate
] of low-skilled labor in the primary economy increases with a.
In sum, variations in a do not a¤ect the relationship between labor demand and relative wages in the secondary economy.
With ‡exible wages, both the equilibrium number of secondary jobs L ¤ y and the equilibrium wage for low-skilled workers in the secondary economy relative to those in the primary economy ³ w L;y w L;x´¤ are given by the intersection of the curves de…ned
by (16) and (19), as depicted in …gure 2. 
where ³ w L;y w L;x´¤ · 1 must hold in such an equilibrium.
There may be limits to wage di¤erentiation across sectors due to union power, fairness considerations among low-skilled workers across sectors, minimum wages, and the like. As …gure 2 reveals, if for some reason the sectorial wage gap
Of course, this can never be an equilibrium situation. Again, we refer to the appendix for a detailed discussion of possible equilibria.
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Substituting (15) into (16) 
is a function ofb; N H , N L and°, whereL y denotes equilibrium employment level in the y-sector in this case.
Note that the B-curve shifts upwards if N H increases, according to (15) Formally, this can be seen as follows. Denote the aggregate price index by ¡; which should be an increasing and linear homogenous function in output prices. We can write ¡ =¡(p; q)´q¯(p=q)
and q = w L;y , the real wage in the secondary labor market is given by
wL;x w L;y´i ¡1 . Thus, imposing wL;y w L;x >b puts a lower bound on the real wage in the y-sector.
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It should be noted that our Cobb-Douglas utility-speci…cation (4), although simplifying the analysis, implies a rather strong substitutability between output y of the secondary economy (say, cleaning services) and the di¤erentiated good (say, cars). If, for instance, instead of (4) we would have assumed quasi-linear preferences, then mrs would not depend on total output Q in the primary economy. Thus, mrs would also be independent of Â ¤ in this case. Since, the real wage rate of low-skilled labor in the primary economy Proof. Use (15)- (21) and proposition 2.
Thus, an increase in°is capable to account for increasing labor market segmentation which is revealed by both downsizing of low-skilled labor in the primary labor market and rising wage pressure for already low-paid work in the secondary labor market. Productivity changes which may accompany the variations in°do not a¤ect this result.
As pointed out above, an increase in skill supply N H shifts up the B-function, and thus is a possible mean to counteract the e¤ect of°towards segmentation and rising inequality. These opposing e¤ects of N H and°reminds one of the the old debate on the race between education and technological change (see Tinbergen, 1975) . Also recent discussions to promote immigration of high-skilled labor ("green card") can be interpreted as an attempt to accommodate technological changes. However, the implied reduction of N H in the source countries has of course corresponding adverse e¤ects.
Conclusion
Firm-level evidence suggests that skill-upgrading, computerization and workplace decentralization are strongly related (For an excellent survey of this evidence, see Bryanjol¤son and Hitt, 2000.) Moreover, the evidence suggests that skill-upgrading in manufacturing …rms is the result of downsizing of low-skilled labor, rather than increases in high-skilled employment (e.g. Berman, Bound and Grichilis, 1994) .
That is, declining earning opportunities for low-skilled workers seem to be due to changes in methods to organize work, rather than mere (biased) changes in the production technology.
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In our model, changes in the organization of work have a very natural place, since organization of production by non-production workers is the central building block of the model. Our model has formalized the idea that …rms (in the primary economy) have to create workplaces by using the endogenous sunk cost approach from the IO literature. We have shown that the incentive of …rms to create workplaces depends on the organizational technology. New methods of organization like customer orientation, international production or decentralized information-processing and decisionmaking requires relatively high abilities of workers. In other words, the costs of organizing jobs for low-skilled workers rises under new organization methods. This has been shown to induce …rms in the primary economy to an upgrading of the skill-structure by downsizing their low-skilled work force. The workers who are set free from the primary economy constitute additional supply of low-skilled workers in the secondary labor market. Typically, with ‡exible wages the secondary economy expands and wages for low-skilled labor go down. This is not only consistent with the evidence of rising overall wage inequality in Anglo-American countries, but also with the expansion of a low-paid service sector. In contrast, with rigid wages unemployment is raised and wage inequality may even decrease, which may be viewed as the European case. Thus, in contrast to the one-sector models in the skill-bias literature, we can deal with the phenomena of rising segregation, even in combination with decreases in wage inequality. Regarding the e¤ects of a deregulation of the labor market, the policy implications are rather negative. Although higher wage di¤erentiation may reduce unemployment of low-skilled workers, it does not help to create jobs in the primary economy. The only remedy in our framework is the increase in the supply of skilled workers relative to the low-skilled.
See also Bresnahan (1999) , Snower (1999) and Lindbeck and Snower (2000) for illuminating discussions.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we show which kind of (perfect foresight) equilibria can exist in our model. It is easy to see that the area above the zero-pro…t line in …gure 3 corresponds to positive pro…ts, whereas the area below this line means negative pro…ts.
Given expectations ¹ Â e for the aggregate skill-intensity in production in the primary economy, each …rm expects a wage di¤erential ! e x = ¤(¹ Â e ), where ¤(¹ Â e )f 0 (¹ Â e ) f (¹ Â e )¡¹ Â e f 0 (¹ Â e ) (use (7)). Thus, from the perspective of stage 1, the optimal (i.e. costminimizing) skill-intensity is given by ¹ Â i = ¤ ¡1 (! 
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Point A is the zero pro…t equilibrium with full employment of highskilled labor (i.e. optimistic expectations) on which we have focused in this paper.
Note that points like C, D and E in …gure 3 cannot be equilibrium situations. At point C, the term in square brackets of (A.2) is positive such that …rms would like to raise the number of workplaces for both high-skilled and low-skilled labor. At points D and E, …rms want to reduce capacity. Finally, note that any situation with full employment of high-skilled labor and non-negative pro…ts, i.e. not just point A but any point on the line between B and A in …gure 3 can be a perfect foresight equilibrium. Although at such a point (except at A) it would be pro…table to raise employment levels ¹ h i and ¹ l i along ¹ Â e , …rms have no incentive to do so if high-skilled labor is already fully employed. They obviously cannot expect to be able to …ll additional workplaces for high-skilled workers. And deviating from ¹ Â 
